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Edna Greene Medford 
Lincoln and the Constitutional 
Dilemma of Emancipation 
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States. 
?U. S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2 
On the afternoon of January 1,1863, following nearly two years of bloody 
civil war, Abraham Lincoln set in motion events that would reconnect 
the detached cord of Union and 
that would begin to reconcile the nation's .?uvu*^^^.*^.^^.....,.^...,^.....,.,,,, 
practices to its avowed democratic princi 
ples. Interpreting Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution broadly, the president used his 
war powers to proclaim freedom for those 
enslaved laborers caught in the dehuman 
izing grip of one of the Confederacy's most 
sacrosanct institutions. His bold move chal 
lenged prevailing notions of presidential 
prerogative and triggered criticism from his 
supporters as well as his opponents. While 
many abolitionists bemoaned the limited 
scope of the president's actions, alleging 
that he freed those persons over whom 
he had no control, while exempting from 
his edict those under Union authority, his 
more conservative critics charged that he 
had exceeded the powers the Constitution 
invested in the executive. 
Lincoln anticipated the criticism. He 
knew that most abolitionists would be satis 
fied with nothing less than universal eman 
cipation and that, contrarily, pro-South forc 
es would find in his actions reason to brand 
him a betrayer of American liberties. Given 
that slavery evoked such polarization in the 
North, he realized that whatever action he 
took on the institution posed considerable 
danger to the goal of the war?preservation 
of the Union. 
Although influenced by the practical 
considerations of containing the rebel 
lion?that is, not losing any more slave 
holding states to the Confederacy?Lincoln's greatest challenge regarding 
emancipation was to achieve it without violating constitutional guarantees. He 
understood slavery to be the cause of the war, but he believed that the Consti 
tution denied the president any easy solution for its eradication. Whatever his 
personal views on slavery (and there is incontrovertible evidence that he hated 
the institution on moral grounds as well as practical reasons), law and custom 
had deemed enslaved people property (i). Because the Constitution protected 
property rights, Lincoln felt compelled to operate within those constraints. As 
war propelled him inexorably toward emancipation, he sought authority to do so 
within the framework that the Constitution provided. 
The Civil War began as a struggle over national union, one half of the Ameri 
can people believed it indissoluble and fought to preserve it, while the other half 
wished to withdraw from it and secure their own identity. Northern attempts 
at appeasement and diplomacy having 
_ failed, war became the only recourse for 
a president convinced that secession was 
unconstitutional. Hence, in his first official 
act after hostilities commenced, Lincoln 
called up the state militias "to maintain the 
honor, the integrity, and the existence" of 
the nation (2). The decision had not been 
an easy one. When he spoke before Con 
gress in special session on July 4,1861, he 
explained that, 
"It was with the deepest regret that the Ex 
ecutive found the duty of employing the 
war-power, in defense of the government, 
forced upon him. He could but perform 
this duty, or surrender the existence of the 
government (3)." 
Defense of the government ultimate 
ly led Lincoln to strike at the heart of the 
Souths reason for challenging national 
union. It would prove even harder than 
prosecuting the war itself, because the Con 
stitution?compromise document that 
it was?reflected the ambivalence of the 
framers over the issue of slavery. Lincoln 
had acknowledged "not grudgingly, but 
fully, and fairly/' the constitutional rights of 
the slaveholder, but the treatment of slav 
ery in the Constitution suggested to him 
that the framers had deliberately paved the 
way for the institutioris eventual extinction 
(4). The founding fathers and the earliest 
Congress were hostile to slavery; they toler 
ated it 
"only by necessity," he argued The 
framers even excluded the words "slave" and 
"slavery" from the Constitution and 
chose instead to refer to those held in bondage as "persons" from whom "service 
or labor may be due." This was a deliberate attempt, thought Lincoln, to keep 
the idea of 
"property in man" out of this democratic document (5). The founding 
fathers hid it away "just as an afflicted man hides away... a cancer, which he 
Abraham Lincoln and the Emancipation Proclamation, 1888. (Image Cour 
tesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs, LC-USZC4-1526.) 
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The first reading of the Emancipation Proclamation before the cabinet in 1862. Painted by F.B. Carpenter and engraved by A.H. Ritchie in 1866. (Image Courtesy 
of the Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs, LC-USZ62-2070 DLC). 
does not cut out at once, lest he bleed to death' (6). Hence, the Supreme Court's 
ruling in Scott v. Sandjbrd, which declared that slaveholders could not be prohib 
ited from taking their chattel wherever they wished, was "based upon a mistaken 
statement of fact... that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly 
affirmed in the Constitution." That document was 
"literally silent*' about any 
right of slaveholders to take their human property into the territories (7). 
Lincoln had always believed that Congress could prevent slavery from 
spreading into the territories, over which it had jurisdiction. But the government, 
he believed, did not have the constitutional authority to touch the institution 
where it had already been established. Indeed, the i860 Republican platform on 
which he was elected to the presidency declared: 
That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially 
the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions 
according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of 
power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric de 
pend^). 
Lincoln did not stand down from this position when in the weeks follow 
ing his election several southern states seceded and formed the Confederate 
States of America. Far from seizing upon this as an opportunity to move against 
slavery, the newly elected president attempted to reassure the secessionists and 
their non-seceding slaveholding brothers that he had "no purpose, directiy or 
indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I 
believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." Lincoln 
promised that "all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and 
the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the States when lawfully 
demanded as cheerfully to one section, as to another" (9). It was a position he 
held throughout the war. 
In promising to uphold the laws, Lincoln was speaking primarily about en 
forcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, passed in 1850 as one of the compromises 
after the war with Mexico resulted in the ceding of millions of acres to the United 
States. The Missouri Compromise had maintained a balance of free and slave 
states since 1820, but this new acquisition threatened to give advantage to one 
section over the other In an effort to stay the rising crisis, Congress had pro 
posed a series of measures that would appease each region. The Fugitive Slave 
Act aimed to assure southerners that the northern people would be equally obli 
gated to protect the rights of the slaveholder. The law imposed fines on anyone 
who refused to assist in the apprehending of a fugitive or who facilitated any 
effort to prevent recovery. This attempt by Congress to resolve the conflict may 
have pleased the South, but it evoked anger and frustration among northerners 
who had no desire to become slave catchers (10). 
After the secessionist attack on Fort Sumter ignited armed conflict, Lincoln's 
declaration of noninterference met with increased criticism within the Union 
and initiated direct challenge to the administratioris position. Undeterred by the 
president's pledge, enslaved African Americans had themselves seized the op 
portunity to obtain their freedom by flight As Union troops advanced on the 
Confederacy, fugitives from slavery met them and offered loyalty, labor, and in 
formation in exchange for asylum. Even in the ostensibly loyal border states, 
black men and women sought to secure freedom as the chaos of war blurred 
distinctions between rebel and Unionist slaveholders (11). 
Without specific guidelines for dealing with fugitives, Union Commanders 
in the field implemented their own solutions. Some of them saw the advantage 
to 
sheltering runaways and chose to employ them in erecting defenses against 
southern forces or utilized them in a variety of noncombatant occupations. Gen 
eral Benjamin Butler's declaration that these fugitives were contraband of war 
encouraged other commanders to embrace the designation (12). But for every 
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General Butler there was a Henry Halleck who barred fugitive slaves from the 
camps under his command. In the first months of the war, the Lincoln admin 
istration chose not to make any additional public pronouncements on the issue 
of fugitives, but the president, eager to keep the conflict contained and of short 
duration, privately queried the general-in-chief, Winfield Scott, if it "would be 
well to allow owners to bring back [slaves] which have crossed the Potomac" with 
Union troops (13). As a consequence, runaways were banned from the Union 
camps of the Department of Washington and were prohibited from following 
soldiers on the move (14). 
Congress's attempt to turn the Souths "peculiar iristitutiorf to the Norths 
advantage and the emancipating actions of commanders in the field left Lincoln 
less than enthusiastic and, in some instances, downright perturbed. In August 
1861, Congress had passed the First Confiscation Act, which provided for sei 
zure of any property (including enslaved persons) that had been used to wage 
war 
against the government The act did 
not address the status of the confiscated 
slaves once the war was over. Yet, con 
cerned that such action would strength 
en the resolve of the rebels and would 
likely be overturned by constitutional 
challenge, Lincoln reluctantly signed 
the measure and made little effort to 
enforce it (15). 
General John C. Fremont's procla 
mation of August 30 gave Lincoln even 
greater concern. As commander of the 
Department of the West, Fremont de 
clared martial law in Missouri and is 
sued a proclamation stipulating that "the 
property, real and personal, of all persons 
in the state of Missouri who shall take 
up arms against the United States . . . 
is declared to be confiscated and their 
slaves are hereby declared freemen" 
(16). Fremont's proclamation differed 
from the First Confiscation Act in that 
property could be seized without hav 
ing been employed against the Union. 
Moreover, the human property thus con 
fiscated was declared free. Citing con 
cern that the decree might "alarm our 
southern Union friends, and turn them 
against us?perhaps ruin our rather fair 
prospect for Kentucky," Lincoln asked, 
and later commanded, the unyielding 
Fremont to place his proclamation in 
conformity with Congress' confiscation 
measure (17). 
In a letter written in late September to friend Orville H. Browning, fellow Re 
publican and U.S. senator from Illinois, Lincoln reiterated these political con 
cerns, especially the importance of securing the loyalty of Kentucky. But it was 
the constitutional question that was paramount Lincoln argued that the generals 
proclamation, specifically the part which stipulated the liberation of the slaves, 
was 
"purely political, and not within the range of military law, or necessity." He 
challenged the notion that 
"If a commanding General finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private own 
er, for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so.. 
. as long as the necessity lasts_But to say the farm no longer belong to the 
owner, or his heirs forever; and this as well when the farm is not needed for 
military purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military 
law about if (18). 
Lincoln believed that this applied to slaves as wefl. Human property could be 
confiscated, "But when the need is past, it is not for [the confiscator] to fix their 
permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by 
law-makers, and not by military proclamations_Can it be pretended that it 
is any longer the government of the U.S. ... wherein a General, or a President, 
may make permanent rules of property by proclamation?" (19). 
When eight months later, General David Hunter, commander of the De 
partment of the South, declared martial law and freed the slaves within the three 
states under his jurisdiction, an exasperated Lincoln rescinded the order, declar 
ing that as president he would "reserve to myself' the question of whether or not 
as commander in chief he had authority to emancipate the slaves (20). 
Contrary to his response to the emancipating actions of commanders 
in the field, Lincoln did not challenge 
Congress's authority to free enslaved 
people in the District of Columbia when, 
on April n, 1862, that body approved a 
measure to emancipate "persons held 
to service or labor" in the city. As a fed 
eral enclave, Washington was under the 
jurisdiction of Congress, and hence, it 
had the constitutional authority to end 
slavery there. The city had been steadily 
moving toward eradication of the insti 
tution for some time, and so fewer than 
3,200 African Americans out of a total 
black population of 11,000 were affected 
directly (21). Nevertheless, many white 
Washingtonians challenged Congress's 
actions because they thought the maxi 
mum amount of three hundred dollars 
per slave was inadequate compensation 
and because they imagined that a free 
city would quickly become overrun with 
fugitives from slavery in Maryland and 
Virginia (22). 
But 
acknowledgement of consti 
tutional authority did not suggest that 
the District Emancipation Bill was to 
Lincoln's liking. Weeks before, he had 
proposed a plan for gradual, compensat 
ed emancipation, implemented by the 
border states. In this way, constitutional 
constraints would be recognized while 
emancipation would sever the bond be 
tween the slaveholding Union states and 
their sisters in rebellion (23). But none of 
those states had exhibited much interest Hence, when Congress stepped in to 
implement emancipation for the District of Columbia, Lincoln was somewhat 
ambivalent While the measure was making its way through Congress, he ex 
pressed his uneasiness "as to the time and manner of doing it" He preferred the 
initiative to come from one of the border states, but if this could not be achieved 
quickly, he hoped that the bill would stipulate an emancipation that was gradual, 
provided compensation to the owners, and was voted on by the people of the 
District (24). 
When Lincoln signed the District Emancipation Bill after delaying for five 
days, he sent a message to Congress that officially voiced his concerns. The 
president reminded them that he had "ever desired to see the national capital 
Man reading a newspaper with headline, "Presidential Proclamation, Slav 
ery," which refers to the January 1863 Emancipation Proclamation. Drawing 
watercolor, 1863. (Image Courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photo 
graphs, LC-USZC4-2442). 
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An anti-McClellan broadside (1864), contrasts Republican candidate Abraham Lincoln's advocacy of equality and free labor in the North with Democratic opponent 
McClellan's alleged support of the slave system in the South. On the left, Lincoln shakes the hand of a bearded man wearing a square paper labor cap, while black and 
white school children issue from a schoolhouse flying the American flag in the background. On the right, McClellan, in military uniform, shakes the hand of Confederate 
president Jefferson Davis, as a slave auction takes place behind them. (Image Courtesy of Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs, LC-USZ62-945.) 
freed from the institution in some satisfactory way (25). But he proposed an 
"amendatory or supplemental act" that would guarantee sufficient time for 
which to file claims for compensation. Moreover, he hinted at "matters within 
and about this act, which might have taken a course or shape, more satisfactory 
to my jud[g]menf (26). Presumably, he was disturbed that emancipation had 
been carried out absent any opportunity for District residents to shape it, as they 
did not have a vote. 
One last action on the part of Congress would address the issue of emanci 
pation of enslaved people before Lincoln issued his preliminary proclamation 
in September 1862. In July, Congress had passed the Second Confiscation Act 
The measure, intended "to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebel 
lion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels," provided for the freeing of 
all slaves of persons who were "adjudged guilty" of committing treason against 
the United States (27). Again, certain features of the bill disturbed Lincoln, and 
again he responded by submitting written objections to Congress. While ex 
pressing his pleasure that loyal Unionist slaveholders were not touched by the 
measure and that persons charged with treason would enjoy "regular trials, in 
duly constituted courts," the president found it 'startling that Congress could 
free a slave who resided in a state unless "it were said the ownership of the slave 
had first been transferred to the nation, and that congress had then liberated 
him." But what troubled Lincoln most about the Second Confiscation Act was 
the idea that forfeiture of title to the slave extended beyond the life of the rebel 
owner. The act, Lincoln believed, violated Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution 
that stipulated: "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of 
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfei 
ture except during the life of the Person attainted" (28). The enforcement of the 
Second Confiscation Act would do just that by denying the property rights of 
the heirs of the person committing treason. Lincoln's objections led Congress to 
pass a joint resolution that disallowed any "punishment or proceedings under 
the act that would lead to forfeiture beyond the offender's natural life" (29). 
The presidents concerns regarding the Second Confiscation Act were no 
trivial matter He was only two months away from issuing his freliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation, which would announce his intention to make "for 
ever free" those slaves in states and parts thereof still in rebellion by January 1, 
1863. While the Constitution did not expressly give the president the authority to 
free slaves, Lincoln claimed such authority through the war powers. "The Con 
stitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war, in time of war," 
he declared. 
"By the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be 
taken" or destroyed if doing so hurts the enemy and helps the cause (30). Hence, 
Lincoln claimed the right to issue the proclamation as a "fit and necessary war 
measure" (31) By claiming military necessity, he sidestepped the constitutional 
concerns that had attended Congress's effort to legislate freedom under the 
clause 
regulating punishment for treason. 
Despite objections to the proclamation, Lincoln declined to rescind the de 
cree. "The promise [of reedom] being made, must be kept," he declared (32). 
But his resoluteness masked the fear that his decree would face legal challenge. 
Moreover, he recognized that while freeing enslaved people in the Confederacy, 
slavery as an institution had not been abolished Hence, during the summer of 
1864, he joined Congress in pressing for the passage of a constitutional amend 
ment banning slavery. When in February 1865, Congress passed the Thirteenth 
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Amendment and submitted it to the states for ratification, Lincoln declared it 
"a King's cure for all the evils" (33). Interestingly, shortly thereafter, he drafted a 
recommendation to Congress that proposed that compensation payments be 
made to all the slaveholding states?inducting those currently in the Confed 
eracy?provided the states were not in rebellion by April. The recommendation 
was never delivered to Congress because the president's cabinet unanimously 
rejected it (34). 
As he moved toward emancipation, Lincoln looked to the Constitution 
for guidance, ever careful to conform to what he believed were the guar 
antees of that document. Since enslaved people were deemed property, 
he felt it imperative to address the legality of efforts to liberate them from 
the perspective of the constitutional rights of the slaveholder. Although 
he acknowledged the humanity (albeit inferior to whites, in his estima 
tion) of black men and women, issues of emancipation within the context 
of constitutional constraints precluded any humanitarian sentiment as a 
part of "official duty." "What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do 
because I believe it helps to save the Union," he had declared. "[A]nd what 
I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union" 
(35). Despite the limitations it placed on presidential emancipation, the 
Constitution had given him the authority to save the Union and begin the 
destruction of slavery throughout the nation. 
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